Anterior Insula Activity Reflects the Effects of Intentionality on the Anticipation of Aversive Stimulation by Liljeholm, Mimi et al.
Behavioral/Cognitive
Anterior Insula Activity Reflects the Effects of Intentionality
on the Anticipation of Aversive Stimulation
Mimi Liljeholm,1,2 Simon Dunne,1,3 and John P. O’Doherty1,3
1Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland, 2Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine,
California 92697, and 3Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences and Computation and Neural Systems Program, California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, California 91125
If someone causes you harm, your affective reaction to that person might be profoundly influenced by your inferences about the
intentionality of their actions. In the present study, we aimed to understand how affective responses to a biologically salient aversive
outcome administered by others are modulated by the extent to which a given individual is judged to have deliberately or inadvertently
delivered the outcome.Using fMRI,we examinedhowneural responses to anticipation and receipt of an aversive stimulus aremodulated
by this fundamental social judgment. We found that affective evaluations about an individual whose actions led to either noxious or
neutral consequences for the subject did indeed depend on the perceived intentions of that individual. At the neural level, activity in the
anterior insula correlated with the interaction between perceived intentionality and anticipated outcome valence, suggesting that this
region reflects the influence of mental state attribution on aversive expectations
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Introduction
Imagine that you are working in an office and a colleague brushes
past, knocking a scalding hot cup of coffee into your lap. Perhaps
your reaction, and subsequent evaluative judgments regarding
this colleague, would be very different depending on your infer-
ences about their intent: if you think that the colleague spilled
their coffee on you deliberately, youwould likely develop a strong
antipathy toward that individual. If, on the other hand, you no-
ticed that the colleague tripped while going past your desk, thus
attributing a lack of intentionality to their actions, youmight not
develop a strong aversion to that person. Inferences about an
individual’s intent play a critical role in judgments about moral
conduct and criminal liability. It is not known, however, whether
such abstract attributions also modulate affective responses to
directly experienced biologically salient aversive stimuli. In this
study, probing the limits of social cognition, we used fMRI to
examine the influence of perceived intentionality on neural re-
sponses to individuals whose actions resulted in the immediate
delivery of a noxious stimulus to the subject in the scanner.
While in the scanner, the subject observed four confederates,
each of whom was choosing between two options that yielded
slightly different monetary outcomes for the confederate. Each
decision by a confederate resulted in the immediate delivery of
one of two liquid outcomes, the aversive flavor (salty tea) or an
affectively neutral taste (water), to the subject in the scanner via
an electronic syringe pump positioned in the control room. In
the initial setup, the subject was made to believe that two of the
confederates knew about the consequences of their actions for the
subject in the scanner (intentional), whereas the other two did
not (nonintentional). One confederate in each intentionality
condition routinely chose the option associated with the delivery
of the aversive outcome, ostensibly for a minor monetary gain (1
cent per trial), whereas the other routinely delivered the neutral
one for the same monetary gain (see Fig. 1A). We hypothesized
that there would be an interaction between perceived intention-
ality and predicted outcome valence, such that the difference
between evaluative ratings of a confederate that had delivered
the aversive outcome and one that had delivered the neutral out-
come would be greater in the intentional than in the noninten-
tional condition, and that this interaction would be mediated by
areas implicated in both representing intentionality and in en-
coding predictions about aversive outcomes.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We ran two versions of the study: Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Nine-
teen healthy normal volunteers (9 males, age 22.13 4.04 years) partic-
ipated in Experiment 1, and 18 healthy normal volunteers (9 males, age
22.74  2.86 years) in Experiment 2. All participants were recruited
locally from the city of Dublin, Ireland. In addition, for each participant
in the scanner, another 4 confederates played the role of the individuals
outside the scanner. To ensure availability, a total of 12 confederates (all
male) were recruited from Trinity College Dublin, 4 of whom were as-
signed to participate in a given experimental session. The assignment of
these 4 confederates to intentionality and outcome valence conditions
Received March 19, 2014; revised June 22, 2014; accepted July 14, 2014.
Author contributions: M.L. and J.P.O. designed research; M.L. and S.D. performed research; M.L. analyzed data;
M.L. and J.P.O. wrote the paper.
This work was supported by a Wellcome Trust grant and by support from the NIMH Conte Center for the Neuro-
biology of Social Decision Making (P50MH094258-01A1) to J.O.D.
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
Correspondence should be addressed to Dr. Mimi Liljeholm, Department of Cognitive Sciences, University of
California, Irvine, CA 92697. E-mail: m.liljeholm@uci.edu.
DOI:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1126-14.2014
Copyright © 2014 the authors 0270-6474/14/3411339-10$15.00/0
The Journal of Neuroscience, August 20, 2014 • 34(34):11339–11348 • 11339
was randomized across participants. Written informed consent was ob-
tained from all participants, and the study was approved by the School of
Psychology Research Ethics Committee at Trinity College Dublin.
Apparatus
The salty tea consisted of 0.5 M NaCl dissolved in water to which cold
black tea has been added. This combination of salt and cold tea has been
found in previous experiments to be aversive to human subjects on the
basis of subjective pleasantness ratings (Kim et al., 2011). The affectively
neutral stimulus was composed of bottled water. The liquids were deliv-
ered to the subjects using two computer-controlled syringe pumps
placed in the scanner control room, which were attached to an SP220I
electronic syringe pump (World Precision Instruments) in combination
with electrically operated solenoid valves (100T3M,BiochemValve). The
liquids were delivered intraorally via a plastic tube connected to 60 ml
Becton Dickinson syringes at one end and were placed in the subject’s
mouth at the other end. On each trial, 1 ml of the relevant liquid was
delivered, a manageable quantity that can be easily swallowed while lying
down (O’Doherty et al., 2001). In Experiment 1, a pressure pad trans-
ducer (MP-150, BIOPAC Systems) was taped near the participants’ la-
ryngeal prominence to measure motion due to swallowing. However,
because these data were too noisy to be useful, the measure was aban-
doned in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1. At the start of the experiment, the participant was
brought into a large room together with the four confederates. Four
computer monitors had been set up in this room, each displaying the
choice screen with which each confederate would interact (these choice
screens were also displayed to the subject in the scanner on each trial; see
Fig. 1A). The experimenter verified the names of all present and then read
the following script:
“Each of you has been randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
One of you will be in an observer condition, where you will observe and
then make judgments about the decisions and actions of the others. The
rest of youwill be active conditions where youwill be playing a simplified
slot machine game. On each trial, you will have to decide between which
of two buttons to press, red or green. Each option will have a monetary
reward associated with it and one option will always be one cent greater
than the other. Two of the slot machine players will be in an interactive
condition where, in addition to the monetary reward, each button press
will result in a liquid being delivered to the observer, either an aversive
taste (salty tea), or water, as seen here. [At this point the experimenter
brought all participants over to the two monitors that showed choice
screens with options labeled according to liquid type]. The other twowill
be in a noninteractive condition, where you are only playing for money,
so the buttons are just labeled Option A and Option B, and the button
presses will not result in any liquid delivery. [The experimenter brought
all participants over to the monitors showing arbitrarily labeled choice
screens]. And the assignment to conditions is as follows: (participant
name), you will be the observer, and you have also been selected for
scanning today, so I will take you into a separate room in a minute.
(confederate 1) and (confederate 2), youwill be playing the slotmachines
that deliver liquid to (participant name), so you will be using these com-
puters over here [the two confederates are directed toward the relevant
computers], and (confederate 3) and (confederate 4), you will not be
delivering any liquid to (participant), so you’ll be playing the noninter-
active slot machines over here. But before we begin, all of the slot-
machine players need to have their photos taken, so that (participant)
can see who is making the decision on each trial. And (participant) you
can come with me.”
At this point, the experimenter brought the participant into an adja-
cent room and gave them the following instructions:
“Recall that two of the other participants were told that their slot-
machines were noninteractive: specifically, that they were only playing
for monetary reward and that their actions did not result in any liquid
being delivered to you. Well, that was not true! In reality, their choices
will deliver liquid to youwithout themknowing about it. Theywill not be
informed until after the experiment that their actions resulted in liquid
being delivered to you, and whether that liquid was aversive or neutral.
On each trial you will be shown a picture of the person who is making a
decision on that trial, the choice screen viewed by that person, that you
saw earlier, and a final screen showing their choice. Remember that par-
ticipants whose options are simply labeled ‘Option A’ and ‘Option B’ do
NOT know that their choices result in any liquid being delivered to you
while participants whose options are labeled ‘Aversive’ and ‘Water’ do
know about the liquids.”
Once in the scanner, the subject was presentedwith a total of 120 trials,
30with each confederate. The runswere broken into two sessionswith 60
trials in each (for a depiction of the trial structure, see Fig. 1A). On each
trial, the monetary rewards associated with the two options on each trial
always differed by only 1 cent. In the intentional conditions, the greater
reward was always listed under the option labeled aversive for one of the
confederates and under the option labeled water for the other confeder-
ate. In the nonintentional conditions, the greater monetary reward was
always associated with Option A, which always resulted in salty tea, for
one confederate and always associated with Option B, which always re-
sulted in water, for the other confederate. The color of the two options
(i.e., red and green) and the position of the labels and associated rewards
were randomized on each trial. The confederates always choose the op-
tion with the greatest monetary reward (in other words, the relationship
between the confederates and the experienced liquid was deterministic).
The order of trials was block-randomized, with each confederate appear-
ing once in each block.
At the end of the experiment, participants provided ratings for the
following questions about each confederate, while a picture of that con-
federate was displayed on the screen: “How likable is this person?” “How
angry are you at this person?” “How immoral is this person?” “How
much does this person remind you of salty tea?” and “Howmuch did this
person intend to give you salty tea?” All ratings scales assessing confed-
erate traits ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). The order of the
questions, and of the confederates, was randomized. Postscan ratings of
the pleasantness of the two liquids were also collected, on a scale ranging
from10 (extremely unpleasant) to 10 (extremely pleasant).
After completing the postscan ratings, participants were asked
whether they believed that the confederates’ actions had in fact caused
the delivery of the liquids during the experiment (see Results). They were
then debriefed, being told by the experimenter that all liquid deliveries
had been preprogrammed, and that the confederates had had absolutely
no causal influence on, nor anymoral responsibility for, any of the liquid
deliveries. They were also asked whether they experienced residual anger
toward any of the confederates (none did) and instructed that if at any
future point they felt confused or concerned about what had happen
during the course of the experiment, they should not hesitate to contact
the experimenter to discuss these matters further.
Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, the design was essentially identical to
Experiment 1, except for the inclusion of an additional control condi-
tion, which we call the “computer control.” In addition to receiving the
same instructions given for Experiment 1, the participants were in-
structed that, on some trials, the computer would randomly determine
whether salty tea or water was to be delivered. It was emphasized that no
confederate was involved on such trials and that this would be indicated
by a fractal image taking the place of a confederates face. On those com-
puter trials, the probability of receiving an aversive outcome was indeed
0.5; otherwise, a neutral outcome was delivered. 30 such computer trials
(15 in each session) were added to the 120 confederate trials, for a total of
150 trials.
The purpose of this additional computer control condition was two-
fold: first, one possible explanation for any imaging effects in the inten-
tional over the unintentional aversive condition is that participants
experience more intense affective reactions to the intentionally aversive
agent, and that this increase in the “affective” response is what is being
reflected in the fMRI data. By including the nonintentional computer
condition in which the aversive outcome is delivered only 50% of the
time, we introduce a “weaker” nonintentional aversive condition (with
very low intentionality, and with a lower probability of receiving an
aversive outcome than in both aversive confederate conditions). The
affective response to this condition should be even weaker than that to
the nonintentional aversive condition. If a brain area found to respond
more to the intentional compared with nonintentional aversive condi-
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tion also respondsmore to the nonintentional aversive condition than to
the computer control condition, then this would support the “affective
intensity” argument.
The second purpose of including the computer control condition was
to rule out an outcome uncertainty explanation for any effects of inten-
tionality. In particular, it is possible that participants view the intention-
ally aversive agent as having two competing objectives: one being to
maximize monetary reward, and the other being to not hurt the partici-
pant, whereas such competing objectives might not be presumed to be
present in the other confederate conditions. This may lead to greater
uncertainty about the expected outcome in the intentional aversive con-
dition potentially accounting for any differences in neural responses. The
computer control condition addresses this concern because the 50%
aversive outcome in this condition yields maximal uncertain from the
perspective of the participant (because in all other conditions the out-
come is always reliably given whether neutral or aversive). Thus, if activ-
ity in a brain area responds more in the computer condition compared
with the other conditions, then this likely reflects an effect of uncer-
tainty. To further address this latter concern, we also solicited an
additional subjective rating from the participants at the end of Exper-
iment 2 asking how confident they were that a given confederate
would chose to deliver salty tea for a minor monetary gain. If reported
levels of confidence are lower in the intentional than nonintentional
aversive condition, then this would support an uncertainty explana-
tion of imaging effects.
Assessment of credibility of experimental procedure
When asked, before debriefing, whether they believed that the confeder-
ate’s actions had caused the delivery of the liquids during the experiment,
the vast majority of participants stated that they did indeed believe that
this was the case in both experiments. A few remaining participants (3 in
Experiment 1 and 2 in Experiment 2) reported being vaguely suspicious
of the possibility of deception, although none of these indicated that they
were certain that this was the case. Of course, simply raising the possibil-
ity of deceptionmight bias a participant’s perception of the veracity of the
experimental instructions; in this sense, the more indirect measure of
how much the participant thought that a confederate had “intended to
deliver salty tea” might provide a closer estimate of actual suspicions
about deception. Regardless, because exclusion of those participants who
expressed doubts did not change our results in any substantive way, they
were included in all reported analyses.
Imaging procedure
A 3 Tesla scanner (Phillips Achieva) was used to acquire structural T1-
weighted images and T2*-weighted echoplanar images (repetition
time 2.65 s; echo time 30 ms; flip angle 90°; 45 transverse slices;
matrix 64 64; field of view 192mm; thickness 3mm; slice gap
0 mm) with BOLD contrast. To recover signal loss from dropout in the
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (O’Doherty et al., 2002), each hor-
izontal section was acquired at 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior
commissure axis.
Behavioral analysis
In each experiment, planned comparisons of “intentional aversive” and
“nonintentional aversive” conditions were performed on all ratings of
confederates traits, and t tests were performed on the ratings of liquid
pleasantness. In addition, for each experiment, each type of judgment about
confederate traits was entered into a separate repeated-measures ANOVA,
with intentionality and outcome valence as within-subject factors.
Imaging analysis
Image processing and statistical analyses were performed using SPM5
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first four volumes of images
were discarded to avoid T1 equilibrium effects. All remaining volumes
were corrected for differences in slice acquisition, realigned to the first
volume, spatially normalized to the MNI echoplanar imaging template,
and spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full width at
half-maximum). We used high-pass filter with cutoff 128 s. Each trial
was divided into three periods, based on the stimuli presented on the
screen: an early anticipatory period, during which only the confederates
face was presented (see Fig. 1A, first screen), a late anticipatory period,
during which a depiction of the choice screen, ostensibly viewed by the
confederate, was presented together with the face (see second screen in
Fig. 1A), and a liquid delivery period which, again, only showed the
confederates face (see fourth screen in Fig. 1A). We specified a separate
linear model for each subject, with 24 regressors; one for each condition,
in each trial period, and for each session. Six regressors accounting for the
residual effects of headmotionwere also included. No orthogonalization
was applied to any of these regressors. All regressors were convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function and, for each subject, con-
trasts were calculated for simple effects, main effects, and the interaction
of our intentionality and outcome variables, in each trial period and
each session. Group-level random-effects statistics were generated by
entering the contrasts of intentionality and outcome valence from
each subject into a between-subjects analysis. One such group-level
model was generated for each study, for each of the relevant condition
contrasts (i.e., main effects and the interaction) and for each of the
specified trial periods (anticipation and liquid delivery).
Small-volume corrections (SVCs) were performed on several a priori
regions of interest using an 8mm sphere.We used coordinates identified
in previous studies of theory ofmind [(Young and Saxe, 2009), left (58,
58, 24) and right (56, 52, 22) temporal parietal junctions, medial
prefrontal cortex (2, 52, 22), and posterior cingulate (0, 54, 40);
(Sanfey et al., 2003), left (33,14, 1) and right (35, 15, 3) anterior
insula; (Kampe et al., 2003), left (46, 4, 46) and right (46, 2, 42)
temporal pole] as well as studies of aversive conditioning with social
stimuli [(Gottfried and Dolan, 2004), left (18,9,18) and right (15,
3,20) amygdala; (Jensen et al., 2003), left (8, 10,2) and right (12,
6, 4) ventral striatum]. Unless otherwise indicated, all other effects
were reported at p 0.05, using cluster size thresholding (cst) to adjust
for multiple comparisons (Forman et al., 1995). AlphaSim, a Monte
Carlo simulation was used to determine cluster size and significance.
Using an individual voxel probability threshold of p  0.005 indicated
that using a minimum cluster size of 111MNI-transformed voxels resulted
inanoverall significanceofp0.05. Fordisplaypurposes, statisticalmaps in
all figures are shown at an uncorrected threshold of p 0.005.
To eliminate nonindependence bias for plots of parameter estimates, a
leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) (Esterman et al., 2010) approach was
used, in which 19 GLMs were run with one subject left out in each, and
with each GLM defining the voxel cluster for the left out subject. Spheres
(10 mm) centered on the LOSO peaks (identified within ROIs for small
volume corrections) were then used to extractmeanweights for each of




Postscan evaluative ratings of each confederate (Fig. 1B) con-
firmed that the manipulations were successful. In each experi-
ment, planned comparisons revealed a significant difference
between intentional aversive and nonintentional aversive condi-
tions for ratings of how angry the participant was at a confeder-
ate, how likable a confederate was, and how much a confederate
had intended to deliver salty tea to the participant, as well as for
the rating collected only in Experiment 2, of how confident a
participant felt that a given confederate would chose to deliver
salty tea for a minor monetary gain, all p values0.05. In Exper-
iment 1, significant differences between intentional and nonin-
tentional aversive conditions also emerged for ratings of how
immoral a confederate was, and how much the confederate re-
minded the participant of salty tea, p values 0.05: although
similar trends were seen for these ratings in Experiment 2, they
did not reach significance.
In Experiment 1, significant intentionality by outcome va-
lence interactions were found for ratings of howmuch each con-
federate had intended to deliver the aversive outcome, how angry
the subject was at the confederate and howmuch a confederate
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reminded the participant of salty tea, all p values 0.05. Al-
though there were clear trends, interactions did not reach sig-
nificance for ratings of confederate likability or immorality. In
Experiment 2, significant interactions again emerged for rat-
ings of anger toward a confederate, and for the confederate’s
intent to deliver salty tea, as well as for confederate likability
and for the participants confidence that a confederate would
chose to deliver salty tea for a minor monetary gain, all p
values 0.05. No interaction was found in Experiment 2 for
the rating of a confederates immorality, nor for how much a
confederate reminded the participant of salty tea. Nonethe-
less, as can be seen in Figure 1B, there were clear trends toward
interactions for each type of rating in each experiment, sug-
gesting that the behavioral effects of our manipulations were
highly consistent across experiments.
Participants also provided postscan ratings of the subjective
pleasantness of the two liquids (Fig. 1C), on a scale ranging from
10 (extremely unpleasant) to 10 (extremely pleasant), with the
salty tea being rated as significantly less pleasant than the water in
each study, p values0.001. Planned comparisons revealed that,
in both experiments, ratings of both liquids also deviated signif-
icantly from the neutral 0-point (two-tailed p values0.01), sug-
gesting that each of the two outcomes had affective valence, in
opposite directions.
Figure 1. Trial illustration and behavioral results. A, Trial illustration. On each trial, the subject passively observed a confederate choosing between two options based on a small monetary
incentive, with the confederate’s face and the choice screen viewed by that confederate displayed to the subject. Each choice by a confederate resulted in the delivery of either aversive salty tea or
water to the subject in the scanner. In the intentional conditions, the two options on the confederates choice screen were labeled with the liquids as in the figure, whereas in the nonintentional
conditions the confederate’s optionswere simply labeled “Option A” and “Option B.” Trials were separated by a jittered ITI (average 8000ms). In the computer condition of Experiment 2, trials were
identical to those with confederates, except for the replacement of a confederate’s face with a fractal image and the probabilistic (i.e., 0.5) delivery of salty tea versus water. B, Mean ratings of
confederate traits ( y-axis), from Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 (bottom). Error bars indicate SEM. C, Mean ratings ( y-axis) of the pleasantness of salty tea and water outcomes, from
Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 (bottom). Error bars indicate SEM.
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Neuroimaging results
We analyzed the fMRI data from the two experiments focusing
on three distinct trial periods: (1) An early anticipatory period
(first screen in Fig. 1A), in which only a confederates face was
shown on the screen; (2) a subsequent late anticipatory period
(second screen in Fig. 1A), during which a depiction of the choice
screen, ostensibly viewed by the confederate, was presented to-
gether with the face; and (3) the liquid delivery period (fourth
screen in Fig. 1A). We focus our reporting of imaging results on
those findings that were statistically significant in both Experi-
ment 1 and Experiment 2 (all of which emerged during the late
anticipatory and liquid delivery periods), as these are likely the
most robust. For completeness, we also report findings that be-
came significant when the data were pooled across the two exper-
iments. A full list of significant effects from each study and each
trial period is provided in Table 1.
Main effects of intentionality
During the late anticipatory period, in each study, our test for a
main effect of intentionality revealed significant activity through-
out a so-called “theory of mind” network (Kampe et al., 2003;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Rilling et al., 2004; den Ouden et al.,
2005; Young and Saxe, 2008, 2009), including the left and right
temporal-parietal junctions (TPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC), and bilaterally in the frontal operculum (FO), extend-
ing into the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), ventral anterior insula,
and temporal poles (TP) (see Fig. 2A). During the liquid delivery
period, significant effects of intentionality emerged again in
mPFC, as well as in the posterior cingulate (PC), in each experi-
ment (Fig. 2B).
Main effects of anticipated outcomes
In each study, activity in the ventral striatum (VS) during the late
anticipatory period was greater for confederates that had rou-
tinely delivered the aversive liquid than for those that had deliv-
ered the neutral liquid (Fig. 3A). These results suggest that,
although they had no knowledge beforehand about which con-
federate would deliver which liquid, participants learned to ex-
pect either salty tea or water, given only a confederate’s face and
choice screen, based on the experienced contingencies. The results
Table 1. Significant imaging effects from both studies: one peak per cluster
Trial period Test Area x, y, z Correction Cluster size at p 0.005
Study 1 Face only Intent no intent L insula 36, 18, 3 SVC 12
L TPJ 57,48, 30 SVC 28
Salty teawater Lingual gyrus 21,51,9 CST 125
Intent liquid R cOFC 42, 45,9 CST 138
Choice screen Intent no intent mPFC 0, 42,3 CST 430
L FO 48, 27, 3 CST 498
R FO 39, 24,15 CST 476
L TPJ 57,60, 24 SVC 50
R TPJ 63,45, 15 CST 338
Thalamus 12,9, 9 CST 148
Salty teawater L VS 3, 9,6 SVC 16
Water salty tea Cerebellum 27, 57,9 CST 203
R OFC 3,60, 36 CST 507
Intent liquid L insula 42, 33, 6 CST 107
Outcome Intent no intent PC 6,42, 9 CST 175
mPFC 6, 66, 21 CST 349
Cerebellum 30,81,33 CST 828
Salty teawater R insula 45, 15,3 CST 137
Cerebellum 39,60,33 CST 265
Water salty tea R IPC 42,57, 54 CST 211
R cOFC 21,60, 3 CST 163
R MFG 45, 39, 21 CST 139
Study 2 Choice screen Intent no intent mPFC 9, 53, 22 CST 544
L FO 27, 17,20 CST 820
R FO 33, 20,17 CST 419
L TPJ 48,58, 13 SVC 115
R TPJ 60,55, 16 SVC 11
Salty teawater L VS 3, 11,2 SVC 22
R VS 9, 11,5 SVC 15
Water salty tea Cerebellum 0,52,26 CST 1028
Intent liquid L insula 42, 8,5 CST 332
R IFG 48, 32, 1 CST 176
Outcome Intent no intent PC 12,48, 7 CST 321
mPFC 6, 62, 25 SVC 41
L amygdala/hippocampus 24,4,17 CST 183
R amygdala/hippocampus 21,10,14 CST 283
Salty teawater Supplemental motor 6,7, 64 CST 134
Rolandic operculum 54,7, 19 CST 894
L postcentral sulcus 54,4, 22 CST 283
Cerebellum 15,64,20 CST 2715
Water salty tea R IPC 48,49, 46 CST 589
R cOFC 24, 65, 1 CST 342
R MFG 51, 20, 31 CST 526
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are also consistent with a growing literature showing increased ven-
tral striatal activityduringanticipationandreceiptofaversive stimuli
(Jensen et al., 2003;Wrase et al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2011).
During the liquid delivery period, greater activity in response
to the aversive than the neutral liquid was found in the right
dorsal anterior insula (Fig. 3B), whereas the reverse contrast, as-
sessing greater responses to the neutral than the aversive liquid,
yielded effects in the right central orbitofrontal cortex (cOFC),
inferior parietal cortex (IPC), and middle frontal gyrus (MFG).
Integration of intentionality and anticipated
aversive outcomes
Wewere particularly interested in assessing whether neural activ-
ity correlated with an interaction between intentionality and an-
ticipated outcome valence similar to that observed for our
behavioral measures, such that responses to a confederate that
had delivered the aversive, relative to the neutral, outcomewould
be greater in the intentional than in the nonintentional condi-
tion. During the late anticipatory trial period, in each study, this
test revealed effects in the left dorsal anterior insula (Fig. 4). In the
replication study, planned comparisons performed on betas ex-
tracted at insular LOSO coordinates (seeMaterials andMethods)
revealed that, in addition to a significant difference between in-
tentional and nonintentional aversive conditions (two-tailed p
0.001), each of these conditions also differed significantly, and in
opposite directions, from the computer control condition (both
two-tailed p values0.05).
A test was also performed to assess whether the interaction
effects in the anterior insula were correlated with the degree to
which an interaction was reflected in subjective ratings of how
much each confederate had intended to deliver salt tea. Using
SVC on our ROI in the left dorsal anterior insula, this test did
reveal a significant correlation in the first study; however, the
effect did not reach significance in the second study, nor did it
reach significance when data were pooled across studies, al-
though it was apparent at an uncorrected threshold of p 0.005.
Figure 2. BOLD correlates of intentionality. Betas for each conditionwere extracted at LOSO coordinates (seeMaterials andMethods). Error bars indicate SEM.A, Neural activation during the late
anticipatory period in the first (top) and replication study (bottom). Effects are shown in the temporal parietal junction (betas plotted in middle panel), the temporal pole (betas plotted in right
panel), and the frontal operculum.B, Neural activationduring the liquid delivery period in the first (top) and replication study (bottom). Effects are shown in themPFC (betas plotted inmiddle panel)
and PC (betas plotted in right panel).
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As this effect failed to reach significance, we refrain from discuss-
ing it further.
Additional effects when pooling the data across
both experiments
No effects survived our strict two-experiment replication crite-
rion during the earliest anticipatory period of each trial, in which
only a confederates facewas shownon the screen.However, when
the data were pooled across experiments, significant effects did
emerge during this trial period: A main effect of intentionality,
such that activity was greater in intentional than in noninten-
tional conditions, was observed in the left dorsal anterior insula
(SVC, 36, 23, 1) and left TPJ (SVC, 54, 52, 28). Further-
more, a main effect of anticipated outcome valence, such that
activity was greater during early anticipation of salty tea than of
water, was found in the lingual gyrus (CST, 18,55,2).
Discussion
In this study, we sought to explore how perceived intentionality
influences the acquisition of an aversion toward an individual
whose actions result in actual physical dis-
comfort for the subject, and to identify the
brain regions involved in mediating inte-
gration of socio-cognitive and affective
processes. We found that the difference
between rated likeability of, and anger to-
ward, an agent whose actions had resulted
in a noxious experience for the subject
and one whose actions had resulted in a
neutral outcome was greater when the
agents were believed to know about the
consequences of their actions for the sub-
ject. At a neural level, activity in the ante-
rior insula, an area previously implicated
in both the anticipation and receipt of
aversive outcomes and mentalizing, cor-
related with an intentionality by antici-
pated outcome interaction.
Previous research indicates that infer-
ences about intent profoundly influence
judgments of culpability (Borg et al.,
2006; Cushman, 2008; Lagnado and
Channon, 2008; Young and Saxe, 2008,
2009). Generally, in such studies, partici-
pants are presented with brief fictitious
scenarios in which the protagonist either
intentionally or unintentionally harms
another individual, with judgments of the
protagonists blameworthiness being con-
sistently higher for intentional than unin-
tentional actions. At the neural level, a
network of structures has been shown to
support inferences about others’ mental
state, including the TPJ and mPFC (den
Ouden et al., 2005; Young and Saxe, 2008,
2009). Inferences about intent have also
beenshowntoinfluenceeconomicdecision-
making in strategic games (Sanfey et al.,
2003; Rilling et al., 2004). For example,
scanning participants as they played an ulti-
matum game with opponents who they be-
lieved to be either human or a computer,
Sanfey et al. (2003) found that unfair offers
were rejected more often on human trials
than on computer trials, suggesting that inequitable humans elicited
strong negative emotions, and this behavioral effect correlated with
activity in the anterior insula.
Of course, judgments about the culpability of fictitious indi-
viduals have an intrinsic socio-cognitive component: perceiving
the outcome as negative to begin with requires some form of
mentalizing about the experience of the harmed individual. Like-
wise, monetary currency, and the equitability of its distribution,
obtains significance entirely from an interpersonal agreement
about the valence of arbitrary symbols. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that tasks such as those described in the previous paragraph
appear to strongly recruit processes of mental state attribution.
In contrast, no previous study has addressed the question of
whether such abstract attributions also modulate affective
responses to directly experienced biologically salient aversive
stimuli. Here, we demonstrate an influence of perceived inten-
tionality on neural responses to individuals whose actions re-
sulted in the immediate delivery of a noxious stimulus to the
subject in the scanner, suggesting that abstract inferences about
Figure3. BOLDeffects of aversiveoutcomeanticipation. Betas for each conditionwereextractedat LOSOcoordinates. Error bars
indicate SEM. A, Effects during the late anticipatory period in Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 (bottom). Effects are shown in
the ventral striatum.B, Neural activationduring the liquiddelivery period in Experiment 1 (top) andExperiment 2 (bottom). Effects
are shown in the right dorsal anterior insula (AI).
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others’ mental states can regulate the visceral anticipation of
aversive stimulation.
One important question is whether the interaction effect in
the anterior insulamerely reflects a general enhancement of aver-
sive affect, or greater uncertainty about the trial outcome, for the
confederate that knowingly delivered the aversive liquid, such
that any (nonsocial) manipulation that resulted in this type of
enhancementwould yield the same pattern of activity in this area.
For example, greater uncertaintymight be due to the fact that the
intentionally aversive confederate knowingly choose between
delivering an aversive outcome and a personal monetary loss.
Behavioral ratings, however, make both of these alternative ex-
planations unlikely. As can be seen in Figure 1B, mean ratings of
howmuch each confederate reminded the participant of salty tea,
as well as those of how confident the participant was that, if given
the opportunity, a confederate would choose to deliver salty tea
for a minor monetary gain, are dramatically greater for the non-
intentional aversive condition than for both of the two neutral
conditions: in contrast, as shown in Figure 4, anterior insular
responses did not differ at all across neutral and nonintentionally
aversive conditions.
To directly assess anterior insular activity in response to un-
certainty, and to anticipation of salty tea, a replication experi-
ment included a control condition, in which participants were
told that a computer algorithm selected between delivery of salty
tea and water with a probability of 0.5. Thus, this condition en-
tailedmaximum uncertainty about the liquid outcome, as well as
amuchweaker salty tea contingency than in either of the aversive
confederate conditions. If insular cortex responses reflect uncer-
tainty about the decisions of the intentionally aversive confeder-
ate, they should be as great or greater in the computer control
condition. Conversely, if they reflect attenuated aversive encod-
ing in the nonintentional condition, they should be even lower in
the computer control condition. Contrary to these predictions,
we found that anterior insular activity in the control condition
was both significantly lower than that in the intentional aversive
condition, and greater than that in the nonintentional aversive
condition, suggesting that neither uncertainty nor simple differ-
ences in the overall magnitude of aversive affect can account for
the effects in this area. Instead, we interpret these effects as being
indicative of a unique role of this region in discriminating be-
tween intentional and nonintentionally harmful individuals.
It is notable that the anterior insula did not exhibit robust
responses during anticipation of the aversive outcome in the
nonintentional condition, given previous studies reporting ef-
fects in this area during anticipation of aversive outcomes (Got-
tfried andDolan, 2004; Delgado et al., 2011) and in light of recent
findings, suggesting that this region acts a general “saliency hub,”
allocating attentional recourses to salient external stimuli
(Menon and Uddin, 2010; Deen et al., 2011; Touroutoglou et al.,
2012).One possible explanation for this result is that the presence
of the affectively significant intentionally aversive condition
produced a relative contrast effect, resulting in a much weaker
affective response during anticipation of the nonintentionally de-
livered aversive outcome. Indeed, anterior insular responses to
both rewarding and punishing events have been shown to be
modulated by the overall context in which those events occur
(Elliott et al., 2000), and it is well established that the behavioral
reaction to a particular stimulus depends on the affective prop-
erties of other stimuli that have recently been experienced (e.g.,
Mellers et al., 1997).
Another important consideration is that, although the devia-
tion of pleasantness ratings from neutrality was greater for salty
tea than for water, both liquids deviate significantly from 0, sug-
gesting that the water was rewarding rather than neutral, perhaps
because it allowed participants to rinse out any residual taste of
salty tea. It is interesting to note that, despite this affectively pos-
itive response to the water outcome, the response in the dorsal
Figure 4. BOLD effects of the interaction between intentionality and aversive outcome anticipation. Betas for each conditionwere extracted at LOSO coordinates. Error bars indicate SEM. Effects
during the anticipatory period in Experiment 1 (top) and Experiment 2 (bottom) are shown in the anterior insula.
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anterior insula during the late anticipatory period was specific to
the intentional aversive confederate, with no differences ob-
served among the other three conditions. Importantly, while this
selective response in the anterior insula suggests that “intent to do
harm”may be a uniquely salient event, it does not imply that only
aversive stimuli are subject to the modulatory influence of men-
talizing processes.
The anterior insula has been implicated in a wide range of
cognitive, social, and affective processes, including pain percep-
tion (Baliki et al., 2009), processing of facial expressions (Morris
et al., 2008), empathy (Jackson et al., 2005), and the attribution of
agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002). More pertinently, effects in this
area have been reported by studies assessing the role of mental
state attributions in strategic game interactions (Sanfey et al.,
2003; Singer et al., 2004), as well as studies of Pavlovian fear
conditioning to social (Gottfried andDolan, 2004) and nonsocial
(Delgado et al., 2008, 2011) stimuli. Together, these studies
suggest that the anterior insula may bridge neural systems
involved in social attribution and those that support the en-
coding of predictions about aversive outcomes. Our results go
further, providing direct evidence for the involvement of this
region in the influence of mentalizing computations on affec-
tive encoding.
Our manipulation of intentionality elicited activity in a net-
work of structures, including the TPJ, temporal poles and MFC,
frequently identified in studies on the neural basis of theory of
mind (Kampe et al., 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Rilling et
al., 2004; den Ouden et al., 2005; Young and Saxe, 2008, 2009).
Some such studies contrasted neural responses to short fictitious
stories that require inferences either aboutmental states or about
mechanical and physical events (den Ouden et al., 2005; Young
and Saxe, 2008, 2009). Others have looked at interpersonal inter-
actions, contrasting responses to human and computer oppo-
nents in strategic games (Rilling et al., 2004), and yet others have
investigated brain activity while subjects view animated charac-
ters performobject-oriented actions (Pelphrey et al., 2004; Carter
et al., 2011). Although operational definitions of mental state
representations differ greatly across these tasks, they share the
element of perceived intent: that is, inferences about an agent’s
knowledge of, and desire to bring about, the outcome of their
action. One possibility, therefore, is that the implicated areas
serve specifically to detect, and assess the consequences of, goal-
directed behavior.
In conclusion, our results show, at both behavioral and neural
levels, that responses to visceral aversive stimulation are subject
to the ameliorating effects of socio-cognitive representations of
“mentalizing.”What remains is to explain why abstract cognitive
evaluations of intent would modulate evaluations of aversive
stimuli. Obviously, to obtain favorable outcomes in social and
personal interactions, we have to learn to predict the actions of
other individuals. How does intentionality relate to this need?
One possibility is that intent is a critical component of the causal
structure underlying observable behavior (Lagnado and Chan-
non, 2008) and, as such, integral to the generality of action pre-
dictions. Specifically, an individual who intentionally and
voluntarily acts in a harmful way may be more likely to do so in
future encounters, and in other contexts, than an individual that
accidentally inflicts harm. Alternatively, intentionally harmful
individualsmay elicit distinctly “social” emotions (Eisenberger et
al., 2003) that are dissociable from those due to primary appeti-
tive and aversive events, and that serve specifically to facilitate
social interactions and communication. Further research is
needed to pinpoint the relationship between inferred intent and
action prediction, and to explore the role of mentalizing in affec-
tive learning. For now, our results suggest that abstract inferences
about mental states do indeed modulate fundamental processes
of aversive learning, and that this cognitive and affective integra-
tion is mediated by the anterior insula.
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